I would like to think more carefully about the space of mediation between action that transforms one's immediate circumstances and relations with others -what might be called micro-political action -and macro-political action aimed at transforming society at a broader level. For the anarchist, Gustav Landauer, any kind of revolutionary action always presupposed an ethical transformation in one's everyday relations with others: 'The state is a social relationship; a certain way of people relating to one another. It can be destroyed by creating new social relationships; i.e., by people relating to one another differently. ' (2010, 213-4) It is precisely in this space between individual ethical transformation and political action, that we should situate our discussion of Agamben and Stirner.
On one of the few occasions that Agamben refers to Stirner directly, it is in relation to
Stirner's notion of the insurrection, which Agamben views as a form of personal revolt and 'egoistic act of subtraction', which presented a serious challenge to Marx's revolutionary politics based on the collective class subject (see Agamben 2004a, 115-124; see also 2005b, 31-2) . Agamben proposes here a kind mediation between this purely individualistic revoltwhat he calls a destituting line of flight from the state -and more collective forms of political action: 'I believe it is not necessary to oppose political action and flight, revolt and revolution, but to try to think what's between them. ' (2004a, 121) I will return to this question of collective action. But for the present, we need to examine Stirner's concept of insurrection (Empörung or 'Uprising'), which he distinguishes from revolution and yet which, as I would suggest, does not exclude or rule out other forms of transformative political action, acting, rather, as a necessary supplement to them. Stirner says:
Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men's discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The Revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on 'institutions'. It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established (1995, ; all emphasis in original).
Where the revolution works to transform external social and political conditions and institutions, the insurrection is aimed at one's own self-transformation (it starts 'from men's discontent with themselves'); it involves placing oneself above external conditions and constraints, whereupon these constraints simply disintegrate. It starts from the affirmation of the self, and the political consequences flow from this. The insurrection, unlike the revolution, works against institutions -but not necessarily in the sense of seeking to get rid of all institutions, as this would lead simply to different kinds of institutions -but rather in the sense of asserting one's power over institutions, and indeed, one's autonomy from them. It suggests a way of unbinding ourselves from systems of power and our dependency on them, even our desire for them (it is a 'working forth of me out of the established'). It is, more precisely, extra-institutional rather than anti-institutional.
We can see that this notion of insurrection is radically different from most understandings of political action. It eschews the idea of an overarching project of emancipation; freedom is not the end goal of the insurrection but, rather, its starting point. In this sense, it is ontologically anarchic; it emanates from a radical indeterminacy that characterizes subjectivity. In other words, the insurrection starts not with the desire to change external conditions which might be said to oppress the individual, but rather with the assertion of the self over these conditions. So, rather than a revolutionary project which sets itself the goal of liberating people from institutionalized power -and which risks merely imposing upon them another kind of power in its place -the insurrection allows people to constitute their own freedom by first reclaiming their own self.
Destituent Power
To grasp the insurrection in its specificity, it is necessary to relate it to the category of destituent power, which has become more prominent in the wake of recent mobilizations against neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, the concept of destituent power first emerged in the analysis by Colectivo Situaciones of the popular uprisings against neoliberal policies in Argentina in 2001. Poder destituyente referred to specific kind of political action which took the form of a refusal of the legitimacy of governing political and legal institutions. This was symbolised by the slogan of these movements: 'Que se vayan todos!' ('They all must go!'), signifying a complete rejection of Argentina's political and economic elites. Destituent power referred, then, to an extra-institutional form of political mobilization which sought autonomy from state institutions rather than the representing specific demands and interests through the state. However, this uprising was at the same time different from a revolution: it was not an attempt to violently overthrow the existing political system with a view to establishing a new one in its place. Rather, the Argentinan insurrection signified a de-instituting, rather than instituting, moment: a withdrawal of support from the sovereign political order, without the desire to replace it with another sovereign political order. Sovereignty is instead suspended, deposed, de-instituted. Colectivo Situactiones refer, then, to a movement that 'far from founding a new sovereign order, operates by delegitimizing the politics executed in its name.' (Colectivo Situaciones 2002, 52) . However, as they point out, this refusal of sovereignty does not make such movements apolitical; rather, 'to renounce support to a representative (sovereign) politics is the condition -and the premise -of situational thinking and of a series of practices whose meanings are no longer demanded from the state. ' (2002, 53-4) The de-instituting gesture characteristic of such movements does not renounce politics as such, but instead opens up alternative spaces for political practices, discourses and forms of association which exceed the state and whose meaning is no longer determined by it.
A similar notion of destituent power has been proposed by political theorist, Raffaele
Laudani, who, in reference to radical social movements not only in Latin America, but also in the Middle East (the Arab Spring) and throughout Europe and North America, also points to a rejection of established modes of representation. Destituent action, in contrast to civil disobedience, is not the desire to change particular laws or government policies, but instead refuses the very legitimacy of the political-legal order by withdrawing support from it. Yet, as Laudani argues, destituent power is also distinct from revolutionary action and cannot be seen simply anti-institutional:
Despite carrying clear libertarian instances, destituent power is not anti-institutional per se, because, on the contrary, it makes the assumption of the nonartificial and ineradicable presence of power and its institutions. Its action is instead extrainstitutional, in the sense that unlike revolution and other forms of modern political action inspired by constituent power, it is not primarily motivated by an institutionalizing end (2013, (4) (5) . This is an important point, which will become central to my own theorisation of the destituent dimension of the insurrection: unlike revolutions, which always risk the re-institution of power, insurrections, in suspending the operation of power, seek to keep open a space of political contingency in which new and autonomous practices, discourses and relations might emerge.
In developing this notion of insurrection, we can turn to Giorgio Agamben's own understanding of destituent power, which he distinguishes from Antonio Negri's idea of constituent or revolutionary power (see Negri 1999, 10) . Similarly to Stirner, Agamben (1998, I will return to this important concept of inoperativity, but it is clear at this stage that
Agamben has in mind a form of political activity which is completely different from the revolutionary projects of the past: many of those projects of emancipation ended up instrumentalizing political power in ways that led to their own ossification. Conceiving of politics as a project, as an goal-oriented form of activity which subordinates means to endsand in doing so ends up sacrificing those very ends themselves -is precisely what Agamben 1 Agamben's reference here is to Walter Benjamin's claim that the 'mythic violence' of revolutionary action is essentially another form of law-making and remains caught within the structure of sovereign power (see Benjamin 1996) .
is getting at when he refers to 'work', to politics as work. Instead he affirms a form of prefigurative political activity understood in terms of inoperativity -which I read as a kind of withdrawal from the ontological order of power and from all overarching political projects.
Destituent power may be understood, then, as an exodus from the order of sovereignty altogether, neither operating within it, nor seeking to capture it in a revolutionary sense, nor even seeking to destroy it: all these moves are, in a sense, caught up within the paradigm of sovereignty. Rather, destituent power suspends the very order of sovereignty and invokes a form of life, activity and politics that is autonomous from it.
Ontological anarchism
Stirner's insurrection and Agamben's destituent power both invoke, then, a kind of extrainstitutional politics which withdraws from the sovereignty of the state and affirms more autonomous form of life and activity. While this bears of course some resemblance to anarchism, we must be slightly careful here: neither Stirner nor Agamben can accurately be described as anarchists, at least according to the familiar coordinates of that ideological assumes as the origin from which it derives, and at the same time the destination toward which it is travelling. ' (2011, 64) In other words, the functioning of governmental power is increasingly anarchic, or we could say nihilistic, in that it is no longer driven towards any general project for social improvement or human fulfilment; it is simply the blind and contingent operation of power, which seeks merely to manage the crises -of security, economy, ecology -that it itself generates. Yet, anarchy, this spectre and shadow of governmental power is not to be conflated with anarchism -and actually here Agamben echoes a point made by many anarchists themselves who distinguish between anarchy as disorder and chaos, and anarchism as a viable form of social order without a state (2014, 73) .
What I want to suggest is that both Agamben and Stirner -while their politics cannot be reduced to anarchism in any simplistic sense -might nevertheless be considered ontologically anarchic political thinkers. By this I mean that they are interested in displacing forms of sovereign power without necessarily proposing any alternative (even non-statist or anarchist) social order in its place; in this sense their thinking is insurrectionary rather than revolutionary, according to the distinction I have drawn above. 2 Agamben himself, while pointing to the structural complicity between anarchy and power, wants to extract from this a different understanding of anarchy -one that no longer serves power but, on the contrary, fundamentally displaces it: 'Since power (archē) constitutes itself through the inclusive exclusion (the ex-ceptio) of anarchy, the only possibility of thinking a true anarchy coincides with the exhibition of the anarchy internal to power. Anarchy is that which becomes possible only in the moment that we grasp and destitute the anarchy of power' (Agamben 2014, 72).
According to Agamben, then, power captures anarchy: anarchy is the secret of power, the empty throne behind the veils of sovereignty; it is the nihilism at the heart of all systems of government. To extract from this a different, more positive figure of anarchy the blind, anarchic operation of power must be revealed and brought to its conclusion.
To understand this, I want to propose a conception of ontological anarchy derived from the Heideggerian thinker, Reiner Schürmann. Schürmann's anarchy principle allows us to grasp both Stirner's and Agamben's insurrectionary approach to ethics and politics more precisely. For Schürmann, the experience of anarchy is a fading away of epochal principles.
Unlike in metaphysical thinking, where action has always to be derived from and determined by a first principle -the arché -'"anarchy"… always designates the withering away of such a rule, the relaxing of its hold. ' (Schürmann 1987, 6) Anarchy is therefore the de-grounding or removing the absolute authority of the arché -a form of ontological anti-authoritarianism.
However, this experience of anarchy -understood here in terms of indeterminacy, contingency, event -does not, according to Schürmann, make thinking and action impossible. On the contrary, in freeing our experience from the authority of guiding first principles, a certain space is opened up for undetermined, free thought and action. Action is thus freed from its telos, from the rule of ends, from the strategic rationality which always sought to determine it.
Something like this anarchy principle is at work, I would suggest, in the postfoundational thinking of Stirner and Agamben. This is particularly resonant in Stirner, who rejects all essences and fixed moral and rational categories as ideological illusions promulgated by a Christianised humanism, and claims to detect, at the heart of every social reality and identity, a fundamental emptiness and absence of being: 'The essence of the world, so attractive and splendid, is for him who looks to the bottom of it -emptiness' (Stirner 1995, 40) . Indeed, his whole enterprise of egoistic self-constitution, about which I shall say more in the following section, is founded on a refusal of any positive identity or vocation:
They say of God, 'names name thee not'. That holds good of me: no concept expresses me, nothing that is designated as my essence exhausts me; they are only names.
Likewise they say of God that he is perfect and has no calling to strive after perfection. That too holds good of me alone (Stirner 1995, 342) .
For Agamben, the positive figure of anarchy that he seeks to extricate from the workings of power, refers to a way of being without foundation and without calling, freed from the governing apparatuses that impose upon us a certain essence and therefore a particular destiny: 'Because human beings neither are nor have to be any essence, any nature, or any specific destiny their condition is the most empty and the most insubstantial of all' (Agamben 2000, 94). Ontological anarchy might be understood, in both thinkers, as an assertion of a form of life -that which Agamben calls the Ungovernable (see 2011, 65) -that escapes, that cannot be expressed or contained within, any fixed identity or telos.
Profane politics
The main implication of this ontologically anarchic position, I would argue, is the desacralizing of politics -by which I mean the attempt to dispel the sacred and divine categories that our secular politics remain mired in. Both Agamben and Stirner engage in a critique of the modern project of secularization, revealing its hidden theological dimension. 1995, 43) . These ideas have become absolute and universal, assuming a religious sacredness; this has an alienating effect on the individual subject who seeks his or her own 'essence' and identity within these external ideological categories, and is forced to conform to a moralistic ideal of humanity. This is the same as the effect produced by what Agamben calls 'apparatuses' -abstract paradigms which capture the subject by separating and alienating her from herself: 'All apparatuses of power are always double: they arise, on the one hand, from an individual subjectivizing behaviour and, on the other hand, from its capture in a separate sphere. ' (2007, 91) So the question is, how can this political-theological authority be resisted? As we have seen, secularization only perpetuates its existence and cannot be the answer. An alternative strategy is one of profaning, which is what both thinkers in different ways propose. We must be clear, though, that profanation is not the same as transgression, which, in itself, only reaffirms that which is transgressed. 3 Rather, to profane is to return to its ordinary, everyday place something which had been hitherto removed to a sacred, abstracted place. As Agamben says, profanation is a form of 'negligence' that ignores separation, But around the altar rise the arches of a church, and its walls keep moving further and further out. What they enclose is sacred. You can no longer get to it, no longer touch it. Shrieking with the hunger that devours you, you wander round about these walls in search of the little that is profane, and the circles of your course keep growing more and more extended. Soon that church will embrace the whole world, and you be driven out to the extreme edge; another step, and the world of the sacred has conquered: you sink into the abyss. Therefore take courage while it is yet time, wander about no longer in the profane where now it is dry feeding, dare the leap, and rush in through the gates into the sanctuary itself. If you devour the sacred, you have made it your own! Digest the sacramental wafer, and you are rid of it! (Stirner 1995,
89)
The egoist seeks out the profane as the last respite from the ever-expanding realm of the sacred. Yet, the only way to preserve the profane is to profane the sacred, to seize hold of it with unhallowed hands, devour it, or, as Agamben would put it, return to common use.
I want to suggest here that profanation, as proposed by both these thinkers, is something like an insurrectionary strategy. Secularism, as we have seen, replaces divine authority with human authority; yet, in doing so, it only reinvents the sacred in a human guise, transposing it onto secular liberal institutions. Ultimately it does nothing to remove the place of divine authority and, in this sense, it might be likened to the instituting power of revolutions. Profanation, on the other hand, seeks to undermine the category of the sacred -not by putting something new in its place -but by reclaiming and using the 'objects' normally caught within this category in new and unprecedented ways: Agamben's example is that of reclaiming the law for human use -treating it, as it were, as a plaything -rather than a sacred object endowed with a kind of mystical authority (2005a, 64).
Singularities
The theological dimension which yet persists within modern forms of politics produces certain degraded forms of subjectivity, precisely because it seeks to capture in a separate and sacred domain an essential identity we are required to live up to, and are excluded if we do not. Thus, for Agamben, the continual attempt to separate bios from zoe, to isolate a dimension of bare life as distinct from politically qualified life, produces forms of disqualified subjectivity -exemplified by the figure of homo sacer -which are caught within the sovereign state of exception and are subject to state violence (see Agamben 1998).
Indeed, this is an aspect of a more general rationality operating at the heart of modernity, which, according to Agamben, seeks to separate the nonhuman within the human (2004b: 37-8). In projecting a figure of the human, of man, as distinct from the animal -as has been the characteristic gesture of the Western philosophical and indeed political tradition -one ends up simply animalizing man or at least certain kinds of men. A similar point is made by Stirner, who shows that the sacralising of man produces the 'un-man' as the irreducible remainder: 'the un-man is a man who does not correspond to the concept man, as the inhuman is something human which is not conformed to the concept of the human' (see Stirner 1995, 159) .
Is there a way of thinking about subjectivity which avoids this political anthropology and the alienating divisions it imposes? I would argue that both Agamben and Stirner propose an insurrectionary or ontologically anarchic understanding of the subject: a form of subjectivity which is not founded on any essence or firm ontological category, and which is not reducible to any kind of fixed identity; a form of subjectivity without a particular telos or destiny which would otherwise bind us to systems of sovereign power. This is what Agamben is proposing with his notion of form-of-life, which he defines as 'a life that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked 1995, 143) The difference between the two thinkers here centres around their alternative approaches to the question of agency. While both propose a non-essentialist or ontologically anarchic understanding of subjectivity, different conceptions of agency nevertheless flow from this. For Agamben, indeterminacy is accompanied by -indeed is understood in terms of -a certain determinacy: our absence of destiny and lack of vocation does not mean that we are free to simply choose our subjectivity, but rather that our lack or vocation is our destiny, our calling as human beings. As Agamben puts it, man is 'the Sabbatical animal par excellence ' (2011, 246) . For Stirner, on the other hand, the fact that our subjectivity is without foundation, essence or calling makes available to us a space of radical freedom and contingency, a freedom to constitute our subjectivity in a multitude of different ways. Put simply, Agamben's ontological anarchism paradoxically reveals a certain anthropological destiny in the structure of the subject -even if this destiny is one of 'worklessness' and inoperativity; hence the importance of messianic time in Agamben's thought (see 2005b). By contrast, Stirner's non-messianic ontological anarchism realises itself in the form of a radical freedom and autonomy -an open space for action, contingency and becoming; the subject here, it might be said, is genuinely anarchic, rather than being determined by any notion of messianic time. These different approaches explain, furthermore, why Agamben is deeply suspicious of the idea of free will and voluntarism (see 2013); whereas Stirner, while acknowledging the highly ambiguous meaning of freedom under liberalism, at the same time proposes a much more radical notion of self-ownership and autonomy, from which springs the potential for egoistic self-emancipation. Both theorists propose an indifference to power, yet this is understood in different ways and has different political consequences: for Agamben, this would seem to translate into the sort of radical, yet ultimately self-sacrificial, passivity exemplified by Bartleby, who is indifferent not only to the external conditions around him but also, in a sense, to his self, to his own life. For Stirner, on the other hand, as
we shall see below, indifference to power translates into an affirmation of the self and a capacity for autonomous action. Yet, while these are important differences, they emerge, I
would suggest, from a shared understanding of the subject as a being without essential foundation or identity. Moreover, while one might be tempted to regard Stirner's more willful notion of agency being insufficiently removed from the revolutionary paradigm of constituent power, his theory of insurrection, at least on my reading, makes it clear that the individual does not seek to constitute a new form of power or will a new form of society, but rather simply wills him or herself. Once again, it is not an armed rising 'but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it.'
Of course, many important questions remain concerning political organisation and community. Indeed, the very question of community marks a further difference between these two thinkers: Stirner starts with the individual egoist and is suspicious of all forms of collective organisation, apart from those freely determined by the individual him-or herself -I have already made reference to the 'union of egoists', which is a contingent political space formed by individual egoists for their own ends. Agamben, on the other hand, starts with the question of the community, seeking to rethink it as a space for new forms of inoperative lifehence his interest in the 'coming political community' of stateless people (1996, (158) (159) (160) (161) (162) (163) (164) or in the rule-bound life of monastic communities (2013). Yet, as different as these perspectives are, they share a concern with modes of interaction and association which are autonomous from established and abstracted forms of political community -namely the sovereign statein which the subject is coercively included, or, as Agamben would have it, included in the form of a potential exclusion (1998).
Conclusion
The opaqueness of these formulations no doubt makes them difficult to apply in any sort of direct way to contemporary social and political movements -and perhaps it is asking too much to do so. If one is looking for a program of political organisation or action in Stirner and Agamben's writing, then one will be disappointed. Moreover, in seeking in these thinkers an insurrectionary political ontology which can shed some light on our contemporary political horizon, does not mean that one can be blind to the important differences between particular movements and radical political struggles, which might emerge in very different contexts. To The key concepts I have explored -of ownness, inoperativity, singularity, ontological anarchy and indeed the insurrection itself -may at first seem unfamiliar to the usual categories of political theory. Yet, they are intended to resist the traps of sovereign power, and therefore cannot be assimilated to any sort of hegemonic project. Indeed, they are intended precisely to destabilise and profane many of the familiar normative coordinates of politics. However, I have argued that such a profanation is necessary if we are to adequately comprehend the new forms of post-sovereign political activism and mobilisation we are seeing increasingly around us today.
